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ABSTRACT 
 
This article brings a political economy perspective to the field of Data for Development 
(D4D). It highlights the fact that many projects involve extracting data from African-based 
organizations for expert analysis in advanced economies. This extraction is justified on the 
basis that it is being used for humanitarian purposes. Key actors including the UN Global 
Pulse and World Economic Forum have lobbied for a governance framework emphasizing 
greater emission, personalization and centralization of data. The article shows how this 
approach enables the strategies of multinational corporations which are aiming to become 
data custodians of Africa’s emerging economies. Little attention has been paid to the 
geographical distribution of capacity building nor to the ways in which data-driven 
restructuring may alter existing livelihoods. As African economies become increasingly 
‘digital’, data will become a source of power in economic governance. Current frameworks 
amount to a kind of industrial policy that supports the learning and innovation of foreign 
firms. The article aims to move D4D away from the focus on humanitarianism towards 
economic development, considering the opportunities for African citizens to benefit from 
their data as a source of revenue, knowledge and power. The conclusion suggests lines of 
inquiry for taking research further. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Personal data are accumulating around the world, including in African countries. As people 
place calls and send messages, their phone activity is picked up by nearby telecommunication 
towers, recording their movements and social connections. On Google, they leave behind 
their questions and curiosities. On Facebook’s ‘Free Basics’ they swap personal details for 
free internet access. Mobile money systems record their financial behaviour and, if they are 
wealthy enough to shop at Uchumi or Priceright, they may reveal their middle-class shopping 
habits. At the local store, their data may soon be captured by newly designed enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) software for small businesses. Utility companies and renewable 
energy installations capture payment histories and energy usage. In South Africa, smartcards 
on minibuses capture travel data. In an era when the traditional apparatus for measuring 
social and economic life has been weakened by the legacies of structural adjustment policies 
(Jerven, 2012), one may think of the telecommunication network as a vast but diffuse 
surveillance infrastructure capable of generating ‘big data’ (high-volume, machine readable 
data) about social and economic life.  
 
Lately, organizations such as the United Nations Global Pulse and the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) have identified these data as a developmental resource. Starting in the mid-
2000s, developers realized that data from mobile phones and crowd-sourcing platforms such 
as Ushahidi and FrontlineSMS could provide guidance to bodies responding to post-election 
violence and natural disasters. Since then, Data for Development (or D4D) has expanded 
beyond emergency response into the more general terrain of international development. 
Numerous initiatives have sprung up promising to use data to solve developmental 
challenges; examples include Global Pulse, Orange’s D4D Challenge and several university-
based projects.  
 
As in other areas of international development, the emerging D4D community places a strong 
focus on financial sustainability. This focus is further strengthened by the influence of Silicon 
Valley. Key actors argue that commercial opportunities should be used to incentivize the 
participation of multinational firms. There is little discussion about the distribution of 
commercial benefits or data ownership. The focus is on delivering better social services and 
3 
 
developmental interventions to the poor. At a recent event organized by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) in the UK, for example, workshop participants were asked to 
think about how big data might be used to improve life in the developing world. One 
participant, a senior statistician, commented that it could revolutionize public health systems 
by providing statisticians with real-time information about disease and hospital capacity. He 
commented that he did not care who implemented the system as long as practitioners and 
statisticians could access the data.
1
  
 
This article shines a critical light on the ‘win-win’ narrative circulating within D4D, showing 
how the emerging governance framework allows firms to gain access to the data, networks, 
support and expertise of non-profit entities. Such access allows them to expand their 
businesses and position themselves as indispensable partners. Current frameworks amount to 
a kind of industrial policy with African governments and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) facilitating the learning and innovation of firms. However, this support for a new 
industry is primarily being channelled towards foreign firms, not domestic groups (despite 
much fanfare about youth entrepreneurship). In short, the idea that it doesn’t matter ‘who 
implements the system as long as we get the data’ is highly problematic. 
 
This critique matters for three reasons. First, if we view economic transformation as a key 
driver of broader social development, then it matters very much who implements the system, 
who owns the infrastructure and whose learning and innovation are being encouraged. 
Introducing governance frameworks that facilitate the flow of data out of African institutions 
into the expert hubs of advanced economies does nothing to foster the technological learning 
and upgrading that African economies need to transform and grow. Second, such governance 
prohibits data subjects from making more informed and context-sensitive decisions about 
whether or not it is in their long-term interests to share data with others. Third, we should be 
aware of the overlap between commercial and government surveillance. Efforts to make 
African societies more legible to corporations and humanitarian bodies also make opposition 
groups more visible to regimes. As Edward Snowden has shown us, even in countries that 
                                                 
1
 Fieldnotes from a closed workshop held by IDS in London, 12 September 2014. For a summary 
report of this workshop, see: 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/7198/ER163_BigDataandInternatio
nalDevelopment.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
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purport to have sensible data protection laws, governments have proven to be innovative 
users of personal information.  
 
There is therefore an urgent need to raise awareness about both the missed commercial 
opportunities for African economies and the potential dangers that the ‘big data revolution’ 
poses for political development. This article aims to highlight what is happening behind the 
screens of Africa’s so-called digital revolution and to call for a research agenda that examines 
the broader developmental impacts of digital data sources.  
 
The article draws on my ongoing research. From 2011 to 2013, I participated in a 
collaborative project between Oxford University, the University of Nairobi and the National 
University of Rwanda, examining the impact of fibre optic internet connectivity on three 
sectors of the Kenyan and Rwandan economies: tourism, tea and business process 
outsourcing (BPO). I carried out over 100 in-depth interviews with managers of software 
development and BPO firms as well as government officials in the two countries. I asked how 
faster internet had changed their prospects in global ICT and BPO industries. I also 
participated in approximately 50 other interviews with actors in the tourism and tea sectors 
about the impacts of internet connectivity on their businesses and sectors.
2
  
  
In 2014 I began to focus specifically on the regulatory environment surrounding ‘born-
digital’ data (i.e., data that are created through the use of digital technologies). I carried out a 
further 40 in-depth interviews with software developers, data scientists, lawyers and policy 
makers in Kenya and South Africa about regulation shaping the commercial use of personal 
data. In May 2015, I expanded my fieldwork to Cairo with a pilot study examining the ways 
in which ICTs are creating datasets about the Egyptian poor. I spoke with actors involved in 
various smartcard e-government programmes — such as those using smartcards to administer 
bread and fuel subsidies, salaries, pensions, social protection for the elderly (karama) and 
social protection for households with children (takaful) — as well as firms, government 
officials and NGOs involved in  mobile agriculture applications and smart city programmes. 
Here I was particularly interested in levels of awareness within government and domestic 
tech communities about the value of personal data. More recently, I have conducted 
preliminary interviews with agritech developers and agricultural policy makers as part of a 
                                                 
2
 This research was undertaken along with Charles Katua, Grace Mugambo, Timothy Waema, Mark 
Graham and Christopher Foster. 
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new project exploring data governance in East African and North American agriculture. 
Lastly I have taken part in several international D4D forums including those hosted by the 
WEF, IDS and the Rockefeller Foundation. Taken together, these interviews, long-term 
observations and my secondary reading have allowed me to perceive trends and emerging 
issues.  
 
The article is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the D4D field. I 
describe a number of initiatives that involve extracting data from African-based organizations 
for analysis by experts within advanced economies — an extraction which is justified on the 
basis that data are being used for humanitarian purposes. Key actors like Global Pulse, the 
WEF and GSMA (the global body representing mobile operators) are lobbying for a universal 
governance framework that emphasizes greater emission, personalization and centralization 
of data.
3
 They advocate for open data frameworks for public data and commercial incentives 
for private-sector data providers. 
 
The second section shows how this agenda supports the marketing strategies of corporations 
seeking to position themselves as custodians of data about Africa’s emerging economies. I 
describe the convergence of different fields: bottom of the pyramid (BOP) capitalism; 
information and communication for development (ICT4D); and financial inclusion. Corporate 
and non-governmental agendas are increasingly aligning and corporations are gaining a 
stronger role in research. Little attention is being paid to the geographical distribution of 
technical capacity building or to the ways in which data-driven restructuring may alter 
livelihoods on the ground.  
 
The following section then moves the discussion away from a D4 humanitarian development 
towards a D4 economic development perspective, considering the opportunities for domestic 
groups to benefit. I stress the importance of political economic context in understanding how 
technological change is likely to play out in different countries. In some cases, local or 
domestic groups may claim ownership over data infrastructures; in others, foreign firms will 
dominate. In some, D4D capacities may lead to a ‘by-passing’ of the state; in others, D4D 
capacities may lead to a strengthening and re-formation of the state. As the field is far-
                                                 
3
 The notion of the ‘emission’ of data, as used in this article, refers to the process by which the users 
of digital devices produce and release data, often without being actively aware of it. The term conveys 
the unintentional, unconscious nature of these transactional data. 
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reaching and nascent, I wholeheartedly welcome further research and critical comment by 
others. The conclusion suggests a number of possible lines of future inquiry. 
 
 
THE EMERGING FIELD OF D4D 
 
‘Data for Development’ (D4D) has primarily been understood as D4 human/humanitarian 
development, with the poor characterized as beneficiaries of better-designed developmental 
solutions. Analysing high volumes of data is said to provide insights about the strengths or 
weaknesses of current programmes and to show how poverty or other forms of vulnerability 
might be distributed within a population. As I will argue in this first section, it is this focus on 
humanitarian development, as opposed to economic development, which drives the emerging 
governance framework in line with the commercial interests of advanced economies. The 
poor have been treated as beneficiaries, rather than as potential economic producers. 
 
The United Nations has established Global Pulse, a big data lab in New York with satellite 
offices in Kampala and Jakarta. These labs have gained access to the firehose application 
programming interfaces (API) of firms such as Facebook and Twitter and are mining data to 
track public opinion and behaviour in developing countries. For example, in 2015, Global 
Pulse used such data to track what people thought about the UN Millennium Development 
Goals to help transition to a post-2015 agenda.
4
 In Indonesia, Global Pulse has used mobile 
data to understand food price fluctuations, and in Uganda, population movements.
5
 Similarly 
the telecom company Orange has hosted two D4D ‘challenges’, granting access to call 
records in Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal to international researchers and NGOs (Tatevossian and 
Yuklea, 2014). A University of Oxford project has used mobile phone data to study malaria 
in Kenya; the Swedish organization Flowminder has analysed cholera outbreaks in Haiti 
(Bengtsson et al., 2015); and several data scientists teamed up to contribute to the 
international response to Ebola (Wesolowski et al., 2014). In San Francisco the Global Viral 
Forecasting Initiative (GVFI) has mined internet data to identify virus outbreaks and provide 
                                                 
4
 See the Global Pulse website: 
http://www.unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/UNGP_ProjectSeries_Post2015_Priorities_2014_0.pd
f 
5
 Discussions with Anoush Tatevossian, 12–14 May 2014. 
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early warning advice.
6
 Harvard, Stanford and Leiden universities have all launched projects 
seeking to use digital data to shed light on conflict and peace agreements in Africa.
7
 
International statisticians have come together within the Paris 21 movement, the Global 
Centre for Development and the Data Pop Alliance to promote the use of digital data in 
strengthening identity systems and vital statistics.
8
   
 
Many of these initiatives are made possible through data philanthropy: the donation of 
anonymized corporate data sets for non-profit purposes. But data flow in both directions; 
non-profit organizations and governments are also encouraged to provide data to the private 
sector. For example, Datakind pairs data scientists from the private sector with non-profits 
seeking advice.
 9
 Headquartered in New York, it runs events in New York, San Francisco, 
Washington DC, Dublin, London, Bangalore and Singapore. At one such event in 2011, 
Grameen Foundation shared agricultural data from its Ugandan Community Knowledge 
Worker Initiative with computer scientists and analysts from private firms (Mastercard 
Foundation, 2015a). GSMA’s Mobile for Developmental Impact team also brings together 
private-sector data scientists with non-profit organizations.
10
 Such pairings allow non-profits 
to seek advice while exposing data scientists to growing commercial opportunities within the 
international development field. As one of the organizers of a Datakind event astutely put it: 
‘Significantly, it’s not just the social-sector organizations that benefit. The pairings also help 
data scientists discover new applications for what is still a new and emerging field’ 
(Mastercard Foundation, 2015a). IBM and others have similarly hosted ‘Open Data’ events 
(‘jams’ and ‘hackathons’) in which governments, NGOs and firms are encouraged to release 
data and volunteers are encouraged to donate time (Burns, 2015). A number of African 
governments have established Open Data portals (albeit with varying degrees of 
commitment) while SmartGov Technologies Ltd, a UK-based data lab, has collected and 
aggregated data from 54 African countries in its SmartGov Africa portal.   
 
                                                 
6
 See the Global Viral Forecasting Initiative’s website: https://www.globalviral.org/. GVFI also has a 
relationship with the for-profit firm, METABIOTA (http://metabiota.com/) using the data to provide 
risk management products.   
7
 See the websites: Harvard (http://hhi.harvard.edu/), Stanford (https://peaceinnovation.stanford.edu/) 
and Leiden (http://www.peaceinformaticslab.org/) 
8
 See website: http://datapopalliance.org/ 
9
 See website: http://www.datakind.org/ 
10
 See website: https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/ 
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Across these initiatives, three broad trends are emerging. First, D4D fits into broader ICT4D 
discourses about information gaps and digital divides. Proponents argue that as more people 
‘cross’ the divide and start benefiting from connectivity, they not only gain access to new 
services but also provide data to experts who will use the data to plan their lives more 
efficiently. Data become a justification for new (and old) kinds of ICT4D engagement, 
particularly around automation and new biometric identification projects. Second, proponents 
stress the need for greater personalization. In many African countries, people own several 
SIM cards to benefit from promotions and to make calls to areas not covered by their own 
networks. Multiple SIM cards make it hard to accurately mine for insights and so the WEF 
has made the case for ‘tying subscriptions to demographic information… to ensure data 
generated by mobile devices is as individualized as possible’ (WEF, 2012: 5). Such concern 
also reflects anxieties about insecurity and terrorism. Many African governments have now 
made it mandatory for citizens to register their devices with government (Donovan and 
Martin, 2014). Third, proponents advocate greater centralization, arguing that when different 
data sources are paired together, new insights can be gleaned. IBM has accordingly launched 
Lucy, a US$ 100 million lab in Nairobi that aims to use big data to solve ‘developmental 
problems’. Employing its supercomputer, Watson, and gathering as much data as it can, IBM 
draws on domestic government, academic, business and NGO expertise to tackle issues 
related to education, sanitation, healthcare and agriculture. As we will see below, preference 
for centralization has also helped firms like Facebook and Mastercard to position themselves 
at the centre of a growing information network. Together these trends tend towards a 
principle of data maximization: more data are considered better data (Taylor, 2015). 
 
Data, as an abstract concept, is described as a ‘public good’ and as a ‘resource’ that just needs 
to be ‘unlocked’, ‘harnessed’ and ‘tapped’, rather than as discrete sources of information 
circulating within specific contexts and bureaucratic systems (Puschmann and Burgess, 
2014). Since expertise is rare and valuable, proponents aim to incentivize the participation of 
those with expertise and make it easier for data to flow out of institutions that lack expertise. 
In most cases, data must therefore be ‘unlocked’ from organizations based in Africa and 
provided to experts based in advanced economies. Some organizations, such as the Data 
Science Academy in London, UK, Dedan Kimathi University of Technology in Nyeri, 
Kenya, and the University of Sheffield, UK, have advocated for African-based training 
programmes to strengthen the technical skills of domestic data scientists.  
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Within D4D forums hosted by organizations such as the WEF and IDS, discussions have 
focused on securing a legal environment for the free flow of public data (from both 
government and non-profit organizations). The argument is that public data have been paid 
for by public expenses and therefore belong to ‘society’. This conceptualization is clearest in 
the ‘data commons’ model, in which data are held in one central and open repository, 
available to journalists, activists and statisticians, as well as private firms and entrepreneurs. 
This discourse is similar to arguments made in the early days of biotechnology with 
proponents supporting the collectivization of genetic resources (Juma and Ojwang, 1989; 
Meagher, 1990). In contrast, participation from the private sector must make business sense. 
These same forums thus stress the need to find business models that incentivize private 
participation. For start-up entrepreneurs, this framework encourages them to monetize data 
by selling data (or the analysis of data) to third parties. For corporate actors, the framework 
means releasing data either through data philanthropy as part of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) or in return for commercial insights or business opportunities. For 
example, corporate actors can become implementing partners of developmental programmes, 
smart city programmes, biometric systems or large ICT4D schemes. In such circumstances, 
firms profit from providing the service itself and potentially from further commercial insights 
gleaned from the data. Net1, the supplier of the South African state’s cash transfer 
programme, has controversially used citizen data for marketing purposes and for facilitating 
private credit, air-time and electricity payments (Mail and Guardian, 2015; Webb, 2016).  
 
This framework reflects the current era of austerity in international development. African 
governments, international organizations and domestic non-profits are under pressure to 
rationalize their delivery models (Burns, 2015). Sustainability is no longer conceptualized as 
reconciling environmental and social concerns with economic development. Rather, 
‘sustainability’ has come to mean financial sustainability. Private partners are said to lower 
the costs of public services and developmental programmes, making them more financially 
sustainable. Business school theorists such as C.K Prahalad and Stuart L. Hart have 
developed concepts such as ‘bottom of the pyramid’ and ‘frugal innovation’ to align poverty 
reduction and profit making (Dolan and Roll, 2013). Similarly tech communities such as i-
hub in Nairobi and k-lab in Kigali continuously coach developers in profit-making social 
enterprise models. In my interviews with developers, many felt that ICT4D applications are 
successful only if they are self-sustaining without donor funding. This thinking pervades the 
D4D world.  
10 
 
 
At a WEF meeting on data and human-centred design in 2015, various developmental 
practitioners urged data scientists to put ‘the user’ at the heart of their design process. Foreign 
designers were advised to design products or services in collaboration with local ‘users’ and 
then find business models which allow them to scale up and make the production processes 
‘sustainable’. As a result, many ‘frugal innovations’ designed for Africa are produced 
elsewhere in the world, particularly in low-cost manufacturing hubs in Asia. Robert 
Kirkpatrick, Director of UN Global Pulse, went so far as to ask participants in his group to 
see multinational corporations as the ‘user’ at the centre of the design model, asking 
participants to think about how the Global Pulse system might be re-designed to better 
incentivize their participation.
11
 Linnet Taylor and Dennis Broeders (2015: 234) similarly 
report that at a D4D summer school, Mark Nelson, the Director of Stanford’s Peace 
Innovation Lab commented: ‘If you can measure something, you can design for it; if you can 
design for it, you can create new value; if you can create new value, you can monetize it. Our 
aim is to create peace businesses’. In my interviews, many software developers have moved 
from seeing data as by-products to seeing data as a potential revenue source.   
 
D4D might therefore be described as old wine in new bottles: expert-led development poured 
into new public–private or ‘social entrepreneurship’ vessels. The poor person is conceived of 
as a beneficiary of a well-designed product or efficient social service. This conceptualization 
is reminiscent of an era before participatory forms of development.
12
 That is not to say that 
there is no critical debate within such forums. Privacy scholars such as Linnet Taylor and 
Carly Nyst have cautioned that normal protections are being brushed aside under the banner 
of development (Nyst, 2013; Taylor and Schroeder, 2014). Humanitarian uses of data 
currently fall outside the scope of the existing data protection laws such as the EU’s Data 
Protection Act and the United States Federal Trade Commission’s Fair Information Practice 
Principles, leaving much of the D4D industry largely unregulated. Dangers are heightened in 
authoritarian contexts and in situations where people who are not technologically literate are 
encouraged to use low-cost tools to transmit and collect sensitive data without properly 
understanding the risks of identification. Even data that are passively collected by 
                                                 
11
 Author’s notes from the meeting, 4 March 2015, Barcelona. For a summary report of the meeting, 
see: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2015/ICT/Local_Data_Revolution.pdf 
12
 For a critical treatment of such top-down development, see Chambers (1997); Hart (2001); Heeks 
(2008); Mosse (2005, 2011). 
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telecommunication firms and released in an anonymized form are still vulnerable to re-
identification (de Montjoye et al., 2015). There are real risks and proponents of D4D have 
acknowledged these dangers. They have therefore sought to manage privacy risks (either 
through technical fixes or some form of expert oversight) while still creating incentives for 
individuals to emit data and for firms to participate (WEF, 2014). Key actors like UN Global 
Pulse, WEF and GSMA are attempting to develop a universal set of ethical guidelines to help 
facilitate projects and protect privacy concerns.  
 
Some African governments are also introducing domestic legislation. For example, South 
Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act is quite stringent in requiring firms to re-seek 
consent if data are used for a new, unexpected purpose. A data scientist working in South 
Africa for the multinational data company, SAS, commented that a regulatory framework 
would actually help create a formal market for personal data and thus ease the participation of 
multinational tech and data analysis firms within the country.
13
 However, lawyers and civil 
society actors like the Black Sash movement stress that much will depend on the strength of 
the regulator to investigate abuse and on the ability of civil society groups to raise awareness 
among citizens. The company Net1 has so far ignored a South African court order requiring it 
to stop using data for commercial purposes (Dzonzi, 2016; Webb, 2016).   
 
At the international level, a consensus is now emerging. In a statement made at the African 
Union Economic Commission of Africa (AUECA) high-level conference on the data 
revolution in March 2015, African government ministers declared: ‘public–private 
partnerships should be adopted, fostered and strengthened as a strategy for knowledge 
transfer and to promote sustainable collaborations’ (AUECA, 2015). Similarly the UN 
Secretary General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on Big Data has declared that there 
is a need for ‘public–private partnerships to leverage private sector resources and knowledge 
in the global interest’ (UNIEAG, 2014). There is much emphasis on ‘harnessing the power of 
business’ and ‘fostering and promoting innovation to fill data gaps’. Thus ICT4D-driven 
adoption initiatives are envisioned to go hand in hand with D4D business models utilizing the 
resulting data flows for both humanitarian and corporate gain.  
 
                                                 
13
 Interview, Johannesburg, 1 November 2014. 
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While actors such as UN Global Pulse and WEF have framed such efforts as a ‘win-win’ for 
everyone involved, these projects fit within a broader political economy (Cohen, 2015; Lyon, 
2007/2014). Drives for greater emission, personalization and centralization reinforce 
corporate strategies seeking control over Africa’s economic information infrastructures. 
Framing greater emission as ‘developmental’ provides governmental and non-profit support 
for commercial expansion and private control over strategic long-term assets. The following 
section situates the evolving D4D field in a broader story of corporate interest in Africa. 
 
 
CORPORATE INTEREST IN AFRICA 
 
Digital, financial and business infrastructures are converging to extract profit from Africa’s 
emerging markets. As this section will show, technology firms are providing the physical 
infrastructure to penetrate new markets, micro-credit and payment intermediaries are 
providing the financial and identity infrastructures while BOP provides the business model 
and ideological justification. Data are both a by-product of these partnerships but also further 
fuel for them, for example by facilitating credit through data mining or by incentivizing ICT 
usage to generate market intelligence. These infrastructures are converging under a particular 
idea of development that emphasizes inclusion within existing economic structures rather 
than one that promotes structural transformation of domestic African economies. Thus the 
push for greater personalization, emission and centralization of data serves to deepen existing 
dependencies and inequalities in power and expertise. In order to explain this rather complex 
story of convergence, the following three sub-sections will focus on data about consumer 
markets, data about finances and data about production networks. In each case I show how 
current governance reinforces corporate (and often foreign) control over information systems. 
 
 
Market Data, Market Intelligence and the Expansion of Formal Retail 
 
Due to demographic transition, slowed growth and dampening consumer spending elsewhere 
in the world, Africans are increasingly being viewed as potential customers and workers in 
corporate expansion drives (Deloitte, 2016: 25–6; Meagher, 2016). Currently up to 90 per 
cent of African commerce occurs in informal settings such as open-air markets and small 
independent stores. With increasing urbanization and the growth of a new middle class, 
13 
 
consultancies such as Deloitte, AT Kearney and McKinsey project massive growth in formal 
retail (AT Kearney, 2014; Deloitte, 2016). Goger et al. (2014: 10) write: ‘Within developing 
regions, Africa has for a number of years been identified as the “third wave of supermarket 
expansion”, following the previous first and second waves in Asia and Latin America’. Firms 
such as Unilever, Walmart and Philips are scaling up production and marketing capabilities 
and building regional supply networks to meet domestic African demand (ibid.). Similarly 
IBM’s new CEO has named two critical areas in the coming decades: data analytics and 
Africa.
14
 Technology firms therefore have strong commercial motivations for wanting to 
become information repositories about Africa’s emerging middle-class consumers.  
 
Facebook has launched ‘Free Basics’ (previously named Internet.org and Facebook Zero) 
while Google has launched ‘Google Free Zone’. Both work with mobile operators to waive 
data costs and provide free access to users on their websites and some tied services. These 
firms portray these initiatives as humanitarian. For example, in a story about Facebook’s 
partnership with a Ugandan health organization, Chao (2013) writes: ‘in remote areas like 
Apac, malaria is often caused by information gaps: malaria medicine had not been distributed 
to a local hospital due to an administrative oversight or a health practitioner provided an 
incorrect diagnosis. It is this information gap that people like Venkatachallam [Facebook’s 
humanitarian partner] are engaged in closing with the Internet’ (emphasis added). 
Technology firms frequently make such declarations, with information gaps having been held 
responsible for disease, graduate unemployment, corruption and, ironically, the domination of 
large corporations in poor livelihoods.
15
 This framing raises the profile of the mobile phone 
beyond a mere consumer good into a critical humanitarian tool, capable of reaching the 
remote and marginalized.  
 
Such framing reflects a broader tendency within contemporary business schools and media to 
portray developmental challenges not as complex political problems but as business 
opportunities for corporations wishing to engage at the ‘bottom the pyramid’. Catherine 
Dolan and Kate Roll (2013: 130) write that such business models allow ‘concerns about 
hunger, environmental degradation, and disease’ to be transformed into ‘market opportunities 
for fortified yogurt, cook stoves, and bed nets’ (see also Abdelnour and Saeed, 2014; Burns, 
                                                 
14
 Interview with senior representative of IBM, Cairo, 31 May 2015. 
15
 For a critical discussion, see Gagliardone et al. (2015); Graham et al. (2015); Mercer (2006); 
Murphy and Carmody (2015).  
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2015). Critically, this positioning allows private firms to access the resources, institutions and 
unpaid labour of non-profit entities. In the case of Free Basics and Free Zone, use of the 
‘digital divide’ metaphor allows Facebook and Google to benefit from networks of 
developmental organizations working to enrol hard-to-reach populations. This assistance 
helps firms solidify their domination in new markets and develop long-term commercial 
assets. As one commentator commented at the time of Facebook Zero’s launch: 
For the same reason that companies like Unilever are so keen to guarantee that the 
first shampoo a newly minted member of the global middle class ever tries is a brand 
they make, Facebook wants to completely own its users’ first contact with the web. 
The lifetime value of these users could, in the long run, be the main way for Facebook 
to justify its share price. (Mims, 2012) 
 
Facebook has been particularly clever in offering just enough tied services to make the 
service look like ‘the internet’ while keeping users restricted within the database, thereby 
maximizing data capture. This strategy has been so effective that researchers found 65 per 
cent of Nigerians, 61 per cent of Indonesians, and 58 per cent of Indians agreed with the 
statement that ‘Facebook is the Internet’ as compared to only 5 per cent of users in the United 
States (Mirani, 2015). As African users grow in number and wealth, the value of these 
databases also grows, positioning these firms as potential partners for retail expansion, 
humanitarian intervention and government surveillance schemes. Further, since many 
multinationals use an ‘Avon’ distribution model — in which successful salesmen and 
saleswomen rely on their own social and family networks to scale up (Dolan and Roll, 2013) 
— social networking data may further reveal insights about which individuals will be 
lucrative agents in last-mile retail solutions.  
 
In South Africa, mobile marketing firms such as Nudge have emerged to conduct consumer 
research through mobile phone surveys. American and British firms such as Jana, Everyone 
Mobile and Vision Critical are similarly building mobile marketing platforms for African 
markets.
16
 Pondering Panda, an offshoot from the South African social media platform 
MixIT, also mines its social network data for marketing purposes. In Kenya, mSurvey has 
launched a mobile-based consumer intelligence platform.
17
 All of these firms are aiming to 
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provide detailed information about African consumer markets to help formal retailers develop 
more effective supply chains. To date, D4D proponents have not discussed how greater 
visibility of consumer markets is likely to affect the livelihoods of African businesses and 
retailers. Additionally, as many of these initiatives are motivated by commercial interests, it 
is likely that the emerging ‘picture’ of African commerce will privilege the voices and 
interests of salaried workers and other ‘predictable’ consumer segments while squeezing the 
livelihoods of informal retailers currently operating on small margins.  
 
 
Digital Payments, Data Profiling and Financialization 
 
While Google and Facebook capture social networking data, payment intermediaries such as 
VISA and Mastercard are busy driving a ‘cashless’ payment agenda and are thus aiming to 
re-orient informal commerce into more formal retail environments (Iazzolino, 2016). Many 
‘frugal innovations’ such as low-cost water and electricity solutions use ‘innovative finance 
models’ to offer credit and instalment schemes to new consumers. In line with BOP, these 
firms describe their activities as humanitarian by claiming to tackle water contamination, 
indoor air pollution or the unhealthy practice of trying to read in poor light (Dolan and Roll, 
2013). Use of mobile money and micro-finance allows firms to shift the cost of 
developmental services away from donors or governments and onto consumers through the 
provision of instalment fees, loans and insurance. 
 
As the facilitators of such payment systems, multinationals such as VISA and Mastercard 
hope to gain detailed transactional and financial data about consumers (Dwoskin, 2015). With 
these data, they plan to segment consumers according to wealth, to develop algorithms to 
predict credit-worthiness among the unbanked and to offer individualized loans and credit. 
They are racing against similar efforts by mobile phone operators such as Vodafone and 
software developers, using call records and social media data to determine credit worthiness. 
In Kenya, Safaricom has launched its M-Shwari platform (Cook and McKay, 2015) while 
three American start-ups — Branch, Inventure and First Access — are also trying to 
penetrate the East African market.
18
 In South Africa, the micro-financing firm, JUMO has 
launched across several Africa countries (see: www.jumo.world/) and many of the mobile 
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agriculture applications I discuss below are also trying to offer similar services targeted 
specifically towards farmers.  
 
The evidence base to support existing micro-finance is still uncertain. For example, a 
systematic review by the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) of micro-
finance projects around the world found that ‘no clear evidence yet exists that microfinance 
programmes have positive impacts’ (Duvendack et al., 2011: 2; see also dos Santos and 
Kvangraven, 2017). Yet VISA and Mastercard are funding massive research and 
development (R&D) into microfinance and Fin-Tech (financial technology) in the developing 
world, starting charitable foundations and buying space in media outlets to entrench a belief 
about the virtues of financial inclusion. For example, The Guardian newspaper has published 
a number of articles commissioned by VISA and circulated through the newspaper’s Global 
Developmental Professionals Network.
19
 In these articles VISA’s various African projects are 
publicized and described in humanitarian (not marketing) terms. Mastercard has similarly 
invested millions of dollars into a Nairobi-based e-commerce research lab and has 
commissioned research about how and why people use phones to better market their services. 
Its charitable foundation has also launched a fund to ‘help smallholder farmers in Africa’ by 
supporting R&D for rural payment solutions (Mastercard Foundation, 2015b). In the press 
release that accompanied the fund’s launch, Kenya’s Central Bank Governor, Professsor 
Njuguna Ndung’u, was quoted as saying: ‘Financial inclusion is the surest way to achieve 
inclusive growth for Kenya. We expect that this initiative by The MasterCard Foundation will 
be critical to achieving this vision by extending financial services to a broader spectrum of 
rural households’ (ibid.).  
 
Both companies have also worked with governments to launch biometric identity systems 
(Mastercard, in Nigeria and Egypt) and government payment systems (VISA, in Rwanda). 
These partnerships are particularly lucrative because they provide access to large numbers of 
users who are often legally obligated to participate. These programmes further benefit from 
government recruitment efforts and, in countries where the system is being used to administer 
cash transfers, strong financial incentives to motivate adoption (Mann, 2015). The relative 
power of corporations vis-à-vis government will vary, as will the degree of success in 
achieving full coverage. For example, in Nigeria, many citizens have resisted SIM card 
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registration and the state has therefore sought to enforce registration through commercial 
fines levied on firms like MTN (Tshabalala, 2015).   
 
In the long term, however, the government and formal firms both have reasons to increase 
commercial surveillance. African governments and donors want to link biometric systems 
and payment systems in order to financially incentivize the registration and tracking of 
citizens (either through cash transfer programmes or access to private credit) while banks and 
formal retailers want to verify identities across payment platforms and thus compile credit 
histories and market profiles (Breckenridge, 2016). For example, the Nigerian Guaranty Trust 
Bank (GTBank) has worked with UAE-based Etisalat to launch a mobile money platform 
linked to the Nigerian state’s ID system, aiming to capture the transactions and financial 
records of Nigeria’s 55 million unbanked citizens (GTBank, 2015). Of course, such ‘fixing’ 
raises the stakes of official recognition and poses serious challenges for people residing in 
hard-to-reach areas, people lacking official documentation and migrant workforces, as well as 
citizens who are unable to gain official nationality statuses due to ‘indigeneity’ laws (Manby, 
2014). 
 
This linking also helps facilitate the consumer marketing discussed above and thus re-orient 
‘valuable’ market segments into more formal retail environments. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, for example, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo has attempted to 
reduce corruption within the civil service by promoting ‘Bancarisation’ (that is, the payment 
of all public salaries through banks with official identification) yet some civil servants in 
rural areas must travel long distances in order to access bank branches (Brandt, 2014). This 
inconvenience causes them to miss work and subjects them to risk along the journey. As a 
result, policy makers, NGOs and telecommunication companies have been experimenting 
with mobile-based payroll. In the long term, a mobile-based system administered by a private 
firm will make public salaried workforces more identifiable in commercial databases and thus 
more likely to be targeted for commercial marketing.
20
   
 
While the poor may benefit from greater financial and commercial visibility and states may 
benefit from increased revenue collection and money-laundering surveillance, access to large 
financial and social databases could also result in illegal discrimination. For example, in 
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many countries, it is illegal to refuse credit to someone because of ethnicity or religion. 
However, algorithms sifting through data about mobile phone or social media users may 
indeed determine that a person’s ethnic or religious identity, geographical location or social 
relations provide proxies for credit worthiness and may facilitate finance accordingly. Given 
the patchy (and commercially driven) nature of digital enrolment, it is likely that 
geographical and social position will play a strong role in determining who gains access to 
credit. As a result, data-driven targeting may result in systematic bias (Barocas, 2014; 
Gangadharan, 2012). For example, someone may be placed in a ‘not creditworthy category’ 
based on inferred information (such as belonging to a social group in which other individuals 
have been identified as a credit risk). Yet over time, this categorization can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy; the individual will become progressively less creditworthy if s/he is 
unable to receive loans and improve her/his credit history.  
 
Regulators, privacy and consumer rights groups therefore need to understand how algorithms 
within firms are working, and be wary of letting one firm attain an information monopoly. 
Current intellectual property (IP) laws in both advanced and developing economies make it 
difficult for consumers to check the accuracy of their personal data and hold firms to account 
for data misuse (Citron and Pasquale, 2014). This danger is heightened in repressive political 
contexts where data may be used for political targeting as well as in contexts of high 
indebtedness and unscrupulous practices by retailers and credit intermediaries (James, 2015). 
As Deborah James has commented in relation to rising personal debt in South Africa, 
consumer rights have not been seen as a foremost developmental issue. However, as 
corporations gain a stronger role in the international development industry and become the 
controllers of ever more intimate information, the need for consumer rights organizations 
grows increasingly urgent.   
 
 
Mobile Applications and Data as a Source of Power in Global Value Chains 
 
Lastly it is important to understand how data systems may restructure production networks 
and livelihoods. Current discourse within institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has shifted from celebrating the virtues of laissez faire informality towards 
emphasizing the need for ‘business infrastructures’ and closer integration between producers 
19 
 
and global value chains (GVCs) (UNDP, 2008). Such a framework has been termed 
‘inclusive markets development’ (ibid.; see also USAID, 2014) with organizations like the 
UNDP, USAID and the World Bank placing emphasis on building linkages between small-
scale producers and multinational actors (Whitfield, 2012). For example, much of the funding 
provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA) has funded efforts spearheaded by multinational agribusinesses such as 
Monsanto and Syngenta (McGoey, 2015). 
 
Many GVC buyers and retailers require producers to develop ‘traceability’ mechanisms to 
ensure quality. In agriculture, producers must document use of certified seeds, pesticides and 
fertilizers to qualify as suppliers. Those wishing to participate in Fairtrade or environmental 
certification schemes must be able to codify, record and transmit data about working 
conditions and environmental indicators. Due to the increasing technological sophistication 
of such value chains, Christopher Cramer has described recent developments as an 
‘industrialisation of freshness’ (Cramer, 2015) and has expressed the hope that this 
sophistication may open doors for greater domestic upgrading and value capture by African 
agribusinesses. However, such capabilities are currently restricted to multinational actors and 
to larger African firms with higher technological capabilities and/or government support 
(Dolan, 2010; Foster et al., forthcoming; Gereffi et al., 2005).  
 
As such, ICT4D communities have identified mobile-based agriculture platforms as a 
development priority. Applications aim to improve farm-level productivity and market access 
or what Murphy and Carmody (2015: 25–46) have termed ‘imminent development’ (see also 
Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Examples include CABI’s export information system aimed at 
smallholder farmer cooperatives, which requires farmers to log verifiable information into 
mobile databases and thus make themselves recognizable to GVC buyers. Similar 
applications are being designed by Farmdrive to help farmers record information pertaining 
to financial health and thus facilitate credit and loans. Others such as Grameen AppLab, E-
Soko, I-Cow and M-farm were started as advice platforms but have since developed into 
broader data collection and market intervention platforms seeking to provide financial 
services and market access and remove so-called ‘middle men’ (independent distributors and 
traders) and/or distributors of counterfeit inputs from the value chain. While smaller domestic 
firms exist in Kenya and Ghana, larger players like Vodafone in London (one of Safaricom’s 
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parent companies) are investigating the possibility of launching m-agriculture services 
through their telecom networks and thus potentially scaling up rapidly.
21
  
 
While there is still debate about the efficacy of contract farming for small-scale farmers 
(Dolan, 2004; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Little, 2014), there are no doubt positive prospects 
for farming communities to use digital technology to restructure their businesses and find 
better ways to save, manage risk and supply new markets (Foster et al., forthcoming). 
However, mobile systems could also be used to improve agricultural R&D and more strategic 
agro-industrial policy by allowing researchers and policy makers to track the impact of their 
policies and adapt. In contrast to the ‘inclusive markets’ approach of the UNDP, political 
economists and heterodox economists emphasize the need to look beyond raising individual 
agricultural productivity and improving market efficiencies towards understanding how 
African farmers might better connect to processing and value addition firms within the 
domestic economy (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2016; UNCTAD, 2015; UNECA, 2016; 
Whitfield, 2012). These scholars have pointed to the success of agribusinesses in the USA, 
New Zealand, Denmark and The Netherlands, which derive their commercial advantage from 
the application of knowledge and technology to agriculture. Without building similar regional 
innovation systems, they argue, African agricultural modernization is unlikely to contribute 
to structural transformation. They stress that African policy makers need to engage in 
strategic industrial policy to incentivize the learning of domestic firms and to enforce 
reciprocal benefits from foreign firms through local content units.  
 
When it comes to the role of digital data in shaping future patterns of value capture, we can 
envision different scenarios. On the one hand, designers could work with government 
extension teams, cooperatives and universities to provide public goods or to create 
opportunities for domestic firms to benefit, learn and upgrade. On the other hand, designers 
may choose to partner with multinational agribusinesses and help them consolidate their 
monopoly power and more tightly control inputs and markets. As Jim Murphy and Padraig 
Carmody have written in relation to the broader impacts of ICTs on African economies, 
digital technology can result in a ‘double movement’ in which profits flow ‘downwards to 
direct producers and upwards to global corporations’ (Murphy and Carmody, 2015: 20). It 
should come as no surprise that agribusinesses such as Syngenta and Monsanto are also 
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designing mobile tools for farmers and distributors to collect more detailed profiles about 
their markets and distribution chains.   
 
As I have outlined above, African tech hubs stress financial sustainability. This financial 
pressure is also reflected in agricultural R&D more generally. For example, Leland Glenna 
has documented the growing prioritization of commercially relevant research such as GM and 
hybrid crops within US universities and the under-valuing of public goods such as basic crops 
and agro-ecological innovations (Glenna et al., 2015: 440). In my own fieldwork, I have 
similarly observed developers seeking to identify predictable income flows and asset classes 
(James, 2015; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007) while ignoring ‘functionally irrelevant’ (Meagher et 
al., 2016) groups or activities (such as seed-sharing groups).  
 
Given the reliance on government extension networks and non-profit organizations to scale 
up these applications, we might ask fundamental questions about who has the right to use 
these data for commercial purposes. In cases where a developer has scaled up through a non-
profit entity such as a government extension network or NGO network, the developer is in 
effect appropriating that association’s institutional capacities and social capital for 
commercial gain.
22
 While such a process may allow the developer to scale up more rapidly 
and allow individual farmers to access new markets and suppliers, it is unclear if this 
arrangement is pro-poor in the long term. For example, is it in the interests of small-scale 
farmers to provide data to firms that will share the data with (or sell them to) banks, 
agribusinesses or insurers? Or would it be preferable for farmers (or indeed farming 
associations, governments and African research networks) to retain control and make 
decisions about how data are used?  
 
It is illustrative that an Egyptian developer of a system designed for medium- to large-sized 
farms described how his clients were adamantly against sharing their data with banks. In the 
USA, too, farmers have expressed concern over data ownership within precision agriculture 
(Bunge, 2014). Initially, US farmers were signing contracts with firms that handed over 
control of data free of charge and with little stipulation as to how the data could be used or 
where they could flow. However, since 2014, in response to farmers’ fears about possible 
information asymmetries, the American Farm Bureau (AFB) has forced agritech firms to 
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discuss and change their privacy policies, has developed a ‘transparency evaluator’ to help 
farmers understand contracts and has begun to experiment with alternative governance 
models such as cooperative data banks. Federal land grant universities such as Ohio State 
University may become depositories, and farmers may be commercially compensated if 
research is commercialized.  
 
In contrast with the well-organized and politically effective AFB, African small-scale farmers 
participating in a developmental scheme or an out-grower scheme may have less control. 
Even if consent is sought, such groups may lack awareness about how data disclosure may 
shape their future livelihoods. There is therefore a danger that current D4D frameworks are 
jumping the gun by excluding the voices of actors who may lack awareness but who may still 
have important interests in promoting alternative data governance arrangements.  
 
This section has demonstrated the strong commercial incentives that both multinational and 
domestic firms have in strengthening Africa’s data capture infrastructure and promoting a 
discourse about the benefits of D4D. Justifying greater use of ICTs along humanitarian lines 
allows private firms to draw on the resources and labour of non-profit entities to develop 
long-term commercial assets. While the capture of digital data has undoubted developmental 
potential, we must not lose sight of the ways in which data-driven restructuring may alter 
livelihoods and re-shape governance of production networks and value chains. Currently 
African governments, civil society groups and producer associations lack awareness about the 
true value and potential of their data. A governance framework that encourages the 
movement of data out of African-based organizations shuts down the possibility of 
developing more pro-poor arrangements. In the next section, I ask what an alternative D4D 
perspective might look like. 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL AGE? 
 
Something has been missing from D4D discussions, namely a frank conversation about the 
distribution of commercial benefits and strategic control. When heterodox economists and 
political economists think about ‘development’ they are ultimately interested in patterns of 
economic activity that contribute to a structural transformation of the economy, reducing 
dependence on aid and building the capacities of domestic capitalists and workers to engage 
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in higher value activities like agro-processing, manufacturing and knowledge-based services. 
Rather than view development as problem solving within existing economic systems, 
development is ultimately viewed as transformative of the underlying condition of 
dependence. In this section I outline two groups whose interests and circumstances have 
largely been under-represented in D4D discussions and suggest how their interests might be 
better supported: domestic technology firms and small-scale producers. Throughout, I stress 
the importance of political context in understanding whether alternative arrangements are 
likely to emerge and be successful. Lastly, I emphasize that while corporate control over 
African information systems may expand, this does not mean a weakening of the state. 
Rather, as I explain below, corporate control and state power may be mutually constitutive.  
 
 
Digital Industrial Policy and Domestic Technology Firms 
 
CEOs such as IBM’s Virginia Rometty have repeatedly declared that ‘data is the new oil’ 
(Deutscher, 2013). Likewise, governments in both the EU and China have implemented data 
localization and censorship laws in order to more strategically manage domestic and regional 
data flows and thus advance their nations’ ICT industries in the face of US domination 
(Azmeh and Foster, 2016). The last section outlined some of the ways in which multinational 
IT corporations have positioned themselves in relation to Africa’s new ‘oil’. They have 
focused attention on those countries with lucrative consumer and financial markets such as 
Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa or on countries with interventionist and helpful states such 
as Rwanda. Multinationals have sought access to personal data by promoting Open Data for 
government data, by winning tenders to provide payment infrastructures and biometric 
systems and by partnering on ICT4D projects with NGOs. In many cases, they also enjoy 
reputational benefits through CSR. One might say that current D4D frameworks amount to a 
kind of industrial policy, with African governments and NGOs facilitating the learning and 
innovation of (often foreign) firms in new activities.   
 
While D4D initiatives currently portray commercial opportunities as incentives to mobilize 
corporate involvement in humanitarian activities, we should not forget that these are 
commercial projects and have the potential to contribute to domestic economic growth and 
structural transformation. In cases where an implementing partner is a domestic firm (such as 
MTN, GTBank, E-soko or M-Farm), then the activity may indeed increase domestic 
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technological capabilities and contribute to job creation and learning. However, many 
domestic firms currently lack sufficient capability to compete. As Stephen Spratt and Chris 
Baker have recently written in a working paper on D4D: ‘many of the largest potential 
benefits that could arise from big data are economic in nature, particularly profits for firms. 
But, to a very large extent, these benefits are likely to be captured by firms in the most 
technologically advanced countries’ (Spratt and Baker, 2015: 27). Barriers to entry include 
shortages in expertise, access to finance, brand recognition and access to government officials 
and non-governmental entities. These constraints must be understood and overcome. 
 
Within the popular media, it might appear that domestic entrepreneurship is driving ICT 
growth in African economies. Yet there is very little empirical evidence to support this 
picture. Most positive assessments come from organizations supporting domestic 
technological development and those that are seeking foreign investment and thus have 
incentives to promote success stories (Friederici, 2014; GIZ, 2013; for a critical view, see 
Gagliardone et al., 2015). In my own interviews with start-up entrepreneurs in Nairobi and 
Kigali, many explained that tangible successes were few and far between (Mann et al., 2014). 
Many found it easier to build applications for existing large organizations rather than scale up 
their own applications. Successful deployments included government intranet systems, 
payroll systems and retail and distribution software for large businesses. Such projects 
promised a guaranteed revenue stream and involved lower risk but meant that developers 
could not easily sell their ‘products’ to others. Those that attempted to launch mass-market 
products often found themselves competing against foreign firms with established brand 
names (there are, of course, some exceptions). There are also a number of firms founded and 
run by foreign nationals but cited as domestic firms in popular media. While the presence of 
these foreign competitors may help upgrade domestic technological capabilities, there is a 
need to scrutinize the reciprocal benefits involved in foreign projects and ask where profits 
and expertise from African-based innovations are flowing. For example, when it comes to 
IBM’s Lucy project (discussed above), promotional materials feature a number of East 
African software developers. Yet, it is difficult to determine the true nature of collaboration 
between IBM’s central office and its Nairobi base or, perhaps more importantly, where 
decisions about core business and monetization take place.  
 
Indeed within African tech communities, there is some debate over whether Open Data 
frameworks are really the best option for economies. One municipal IT manager commented 
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that multinationals were most interested in his city’s Open Data initiative.23 A South African 
developer similarly expressed concern that IBM was holding the Africa Open Data Jam in 
New York.
24
 Other interviewees wondered whether there might be more strategic ways to 
govern their countries’ data.25 One interviewee suggested that current public–private D4D 
initiatives should be viewed not as CSR but rather as opportunities for domestic partnerships 
and domestic upgrading.
26
 In place of an alignment between profit making and humanitarian 
development, African policy makers and private sector associations might insist that 
multinational corporations engaging in D4D and ICT4D activities align profit making with 
economic development. In countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa, such 
alignment could support efforts to establish IT-enabled service sectors (Mann and Graham, 
2016). There is also a need to marry digital economy policies with other sectors like agro-
processing and logistics and to think creatively about the role of digital technologies in policy 
coordination and domestic R&D. 
 
Thus, instead of evoking the vision of a Silicon Savannah as a metaphor for Kenya and other 
aspiring African technology hubs (and thus advocating a ‘free market’ trope), it might be 
instructive to learn lessons from other late developing economies such as India, where 
domestic IT firms have mobilized diaspora networks and built strong and powerful producer 
associations to address constraints and build comparative advantages (Saraswati, 2012). It 
may also be instructive to learn lessons from the ‘digital protectionism’ policies of the EU 
and China (Azmeh and Foster, 2016) as well as to acknowledge the strong role of the US 
government in building US technological domination (Block and Keller, 2011; Mazzucato, 
2013; Weiss, 2014). Supporting domestic technology firms would not only boost domestic 
economies but could lower the cost of e-government activities. For example, India’s Aadhaar 
biometric national identification number project has kept costs low partly by using various 
domestic technology providers to distribute the technology across the country, as have 
Egypt’s smartcard welfare programmes. Given the huge amounts of public money being 
poured into biometric systems across Africa today (Gelb and Clark, 2013), African 
governments should be asking what these programmes can do for domestic economies, 
particularly in countries where ICT industries are developing.  
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In other words, while there is much lip service to the notion of local innovation, we need 
much more rigorous critical research into what it takes for domestic technology firms to 
succeed and compete, and what constraints are holding them back. Such scrutiny would 
require politically powerful and technologically savvy government officials to critically 
monitor what is happening within the domestic ICT industry and enforce reciprocal benefits 
from foreign players. This activity, in turn, will depend on their awareness about big data’s 
economic potential as well as the right political incentives to change economic structures in 
ways that might undermine existing political settlements.
27
   
 
 
Data-driven Learning and Coordination for African Small-scale Producers  
 
Frameworks that privilege outside expertise over domestic ownership may be closing down 
more participatory and strategic forms of governance. I have already highlighted the need to 
consider broader patterns of value capture within African economies. Here, I discuss the 
implications for the small-scale producers that use these services.  
 
Applications could be designed to facilitate the learning of users through self-quantification 
and auditing or through the provision of historical data and benchmarking. In other words, 
farming cooperatives and agricultural policy makers could use data systems to monitor policy 
initiatives, make adjustments and learn how to improve their productivity and to upgrade into 
higher value activities. Alternatively, applications could be designed to filter and control 
users through external protocols (separating aspirant ‘modern’ farmers who will respond to 
capitalist inducements from more ‘traditional’ farmers who will not), in which case the 
developers may only have access to the whole database and users may not understand how 
they are being filtered and measured. Both scenarios entail risk. If users are made self-
responsible without prerequisite financial and technical understandings of how contracts 
work and/or without regulators keeping a check on the terms of commercial relationships, 
users may find themselves enmeshed in debt relations (For a discussion of consumer finance, 
see James, 2015: 227–38). On the other hand, if users are externally audited and segmented 
by private multinational firms, there may be limited scope for learning and self-improvement.  
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Alternative governance models could build on the AFB’s land grant university model or the 
model currently being developed by the Johannesburg-based taxi union, SANTACO. Rather 
than allowing corporations or financial institutions to provide a smartcard payment solution 
(like London’s Oystercard or The Netherlands’ OV chipkaart), the union itself decided to 
provide the service. It has invested in storage capacity and expertise to reap the commercial 
benefits and control decision making. It is too early to know if it will be successful, or indeed 
whether such a model is preferable for the purposes of urban planning, as compared to other 
cities such as Cape Town or Nairobi, where technology providers and governments have tried 
to be more assertive over data ownership. It is also the case that this particular union has 
sufficient capital, organizational strength and political power to make long-term investments 
and to assert their interests. However given the diversity of circumstances in which ICT4D 
projects are currently being implemented, it might be prudent to accommodate different kinds 
of data ownership arrangements (both corporation driven and cooperative driven) and 
monitor their outcomes over time, rather than advocate a universal data governance 
framework that favours multinational interests. 
 
Obviously there are benefits to pooling and centralizing data. It has been difficult historically 
to bring small-scale producers into industrial policy making due to their dispersed nature, 
their lack of formal organizational strength and decreasing rates of investment into extension 
services (Bacchetta et al., 2009; Henley and van Donge, 2013). Centralization may make it 
easier for economic policy makers to scrutinize the evidence base of different industrial 
policies and for power holders to perceive small-scale producers as viable partners in growth 
coalitions (Carletto et al., 2015; Jerven and Johnston, 2015). Centralizing data would also 
allow tax authorities to identify smaller taxpayers in a more formal and less arbitrary manner 
(Bräutigam, 2008). However, such policy making is much more likely to be successful when 
producers are actively informed, as earlier research demonstrated (Chambers, 1997; Heeks, 
2008; Mosse, 2005, 2011) and such benefits will only accrue when data governance allows 
public use and oversight of private commercial datasets.  
 
While current frameworks position corporations as the actors with the requisite expertise to 
implement digital infrastructures, it may be that the responsible party should not be motivated 
by short-term profit but by long-term developmental interests and by distributional concerns 
as well. If so, then such a responsibility might fall on the relevant sector’s associations, state 
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institutions or other non-profit entities. The examples of Johannesburg’s taxi union and the 
AFB demonstrate that alternative arrangements are possible. 
 
Thus understanding the impacts on relations between small-scale producers and corporate 
actors will always be a matter of empirical investigation. We cannot assume projects will 
follow some universal logic nor should we assume that projects necessarily empower specific 
groups (be they farmers or agribusinesses). In practice, their character will vary depending on 
which groups have the power to influence ownership and, ultimately, to learn from the data. 
In some places it could be that small-scale producers are sufficiently organized to demand 
control over benefits and strategic decision making. In others, larger entities may be able to 
institute more extractive kinds of arrangements under the banner of expert-led development. 
In some places, African governments may step in to channel economic opportunities to 
domestic groups and use data systems to enforce industrial policy, domestic learning and 
regulation. In other places, organizations such as UNIDO and UNECA could play a role in 
prioritizing long-term capacity building over the narrower focus on raising productivity in 
primary production.  
 
Importantly I am not making a claim that corporations are bypassing states, as some have 
suggested (Taylor, 2015). Rather the situation is more mixed and also more interesting. In 
many cases, commercial forms of surveillance could strengthen government capacity (see 
Gagliardone, 2014 for Ethiopia; Mann and Berry, 2016 for Rwanda). Corporations need 
states to implement their programmes, and in turn states need corporations. In many ways, 
therefore, big data may be a story about the dual development of state power and market 
expansion. From the perspective of governance, there are positive outlooks in terms of better 
identification systems and possibilities for taxation reform. But there are of course real 
dangers when we think about the prospects of targeted surveillance. Conditions vary 
enormously from country to country.  
 
In Kenya, state capacity has been strengthened by the presence of the dominant telecom firm, 
Safaricom. A number of senior politicians are shareholders and are therefore incentivized to 
protect its profitability and professionalism. Safaricom has received tenders to provide 
security and surveillance, and has recently been rumoured to provide transactional data for 
taxation. Kenya also boasts one of the strongest tech communities on the continent and some 
small-scale data science firms (such as Data Science, founded by a former Open Data 
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government official). In Kenya there is therefore potential for domestic technological 
learning to take place and for data to be used for state capacity building and industrial policy 
(although there is a strong market-driven tone within recent ICT policy). In the agricultural 
field too, there are a number of small-scale m-farming applications being developed in 
cooperation with farming communities. Nevertheless the government could do much more to 
enforce reciprocal benefits within multinational projects such as IBM’s Lucy and within 
some of the larger m-agriculture deployments. It might also be prudent to educate small-scale 
producers about the value of their data and the ways data-driven restructuring may affect 
them.  
 
In South Africa the context is mixed. Apartheid left the new democracy with a strong 
biometric infrastructure for political and social surveillance, and thus potential state capacity. 
Due to the current political dispensation, this infrastructure is being redeployed both to 
deliver massive social grants (Breckenridge, 2005, 2016) and to engage in political 
surveillance (Duncan, 2014). South Africa also has a large national champion in the form of 
MTN and relative technological capacity in the ICT sector and BPO sector (as demonstrated 
by the number of professional BPO firms and the mobile marketers discussed above). It also 
has a number of strong research universities that could help boost data-driven innovation and 
commercialization within the domestic economy. In both Kenya and South Africa, more 
research is required to know whether the political environment is conducive to digital 
industrial policy making. To date, much policy has been driven by a more free-market 
approach to ICT growth. There is a danger that more targeted support to specific firms could 
be perceived as corrupt, in which case it may be necessary for professional associations and 
international bodies such as UNIDO to build consensus around the need for targeted support.  
 
In Rwanda the situation is somewhat reversed. Due to the current political dispensation, the 
regime is under great pressure to both transform the economy and establish strong state 
surveillance (Mann and Berry, 2016). It has introduced strong enabling institutions, invested 
heavily in infrastructure and technological training, and has personally brokered business 
deals and managed party-statals (Behuria, 2015; Mann and Nzayisenga, 2015). At the same 
time, Rwanda still lacks strong private ICT firms in comparison to Kenya and South Africa 
and has therefore been dependent on foreign firms to implement many of its larger ICT 
programmes. There is also concern that digital infrastructures are being used both for 
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economic growth and for the purposes of surveillance, with few domestic civil rights group 
left to hold the government to account.  
 
Therefore, while international organizations are attempting to draw up universal ethical 
principles, it may be the case that governance needs to be discussed (and debated) on a 
country-by-country basis and within each country (Gagliardone et al., 2015; Nissenbaum, 
2010; Taylor, 2015). We cannot make sweeping statements about what big data will do to 
African development. Its potential for transformation depends on context and on the 
awareness and capacity of key actors to perceive its value and act strategically to assert their 
interests. What is almost universal, however, is a lack of civil society knowledge and 
activism. Their absence is particularly troubling as the research base grows increasingly 
corporate-led and uncritical. With the exceptions of Privacy International and Tactical Tech, 
very few organizations are raising awareness. Given the international development 
community’s drive to connect African citizens and consumers to banks, identity systems and 
new markets, it might be dangerous to proceed without simultaneously raising this awareness. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Julie Cohen has described in relation to advanced economies, businesses have powerful 
incentives to shape digital infrastructures in ways that make ‘unfettered collection the default 
position’ while obscuring ‘the distributive politics of appropriation’ (Cohen, 2015). She 
suggests that information and technology firms have made a concerted effort to shift public 
discourse away from the need for privacy and towards the valorization of greater data 
disclosure by members of the public (see also Puschmann and Burgess, 2014). Firms have 
lobbied for open data arrangements and have used game-ification to blur the boundary 
between entertainment and labour and thus better motivate user participation (Fuchs, 2015). 
Their rhetoric frames commercial surveillance as something both voluntary and virtuous, 
contributing to public good and economic growth. However, when it comes to the developing 
world, major players such as the UN Global Pulse and the WEF have seen these economic 
opportunities not as sources of economic development for poor countries but rather as 
incentives for foreign corporations to engage in humanitarian development.  
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D4D projects do not merely deliver technocratic solutions to ‘development problems’. They 
also create data of immense commercial value and provide prospects for new forms of 
bureaucratic control and economic restructuring. As economies become ever more ‘digital’, 
data will increasingly become a source of power in economic governance. It should come as 
no great shock that corporations like Facebook, IBM, Google and Orange are building 
infrastructures and lobbying for regulation that will allow them to extract maximum profit 
and maximum strategic advantage. If African governments and associations do not claim 
ownership over these infrastructures, then (economic) developmental opportunities are likely 
to flow outside while opportunities for pro-poor restructuring will be missed. Seizing these 
opportunities requires willingness and competence on the part of governments and 
associations to put in place the right kinds of institutions, infrastructures and policies to 
ensure economic benefits for domestic economies. It also requires greater awareness about 
the political economy of data, a largely neglected subject. While many multinational 
corporations claim to support domestic developers, they are loath to educate the users 
themselves about the commercial value of their data. This reluctance is particularly 
concerning given the push for greater usage among poorer and less informed groups. 
 
So what might a future research agenda look like? Such an approach would mean paying 
closer attention to the distribution of commercial benefits and asking where knowledge is 
accumulating and capital is flowing. For example, economic geographers and development 
sociologists may use Global Production Networks and Global Innovation Networks to map 
the value chains around data and the emergence of territorial innovation systems across North 
and South (Gereffi et al., 2005; Parrilli et al., 2013). Do initiatives by Dedan Kimathi 
University of Technology to build domestic and regional data science skills have any impact 
on the ability of domestic firms to compete and conduct domestically led innovation? What 
about targeted policies and forms of ‘digital protectionism’ to spur innovation? Are the 
activities of Google and Facebook helping to broaden domestic opportunities or siphon value 
away?  
 
Political economists, meanwhile, could help reveal how data value chains are shaped by the 
interests and power strategies of domestic political actors and/or multinational actors (Kelsall, 
2013; Whitfield et al., 2015). There is much scope for comparative research to identify more 
or less favourable political environments for the developmental use of data, both at the 
macro-level of national political settlements and at the level of individual projects. And when 
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it comes to industrial policy, how does control over databases facilitate the learning and 
error-correction of firms and policy makers engaged in strategic industrial policy? Are there 
some countries where laws or domestic ownership of technology firms facilitate greater 
public (or cooperative) control over data systems?  
 
Understanding how market interventions are likely to shape economic livelihoods means 
welcoming ethnographic work on the acculturation of new technologies (Avgerou, 2008). 
Anthropologists are well placed to ask how people understand data infrastructures and how 
they anticipate future transformations. For example, will individuals stop using mobile 
money if they come to believe that it will make them trackable? Will local power brokers 
seek to control use by others? What role do privacy and digital protection play in asserting 
economic claims over data? People will always surprise us with their ingenuity to resist top-
down efforts to control them.  
 
Finally we must consider how big data is likely to change practices of knowledge. There will 
be areas where technology penetrates more quickly and deeply than in other places. Will 
these sample biases entail that understandings and ‘facts’ come to reflect certain kinds of 
communities most amenable to technological intervention and thus make other regions seem 
deviant or dysfunctional? And will the creation of such datasets open the road for more 
remote quantitative studies such as Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) in place of more 
bottom-up qualitative field research in which local residents play a stronger role in the 
construction of truths? 
 
Overall, taking such research further requires collaboration between quantitative data 
scientists and social scientists possessing specific knowledge of how political and economic 
systems actually work. They must get past their apprehensiveness of approaching a 
‘technical’ subject such as big data. At the same time, taking such work further also means 
engaging citizens and producers from the bottom up. This article has aimed to educate some 
of these individuals about how data infrastructures are impacting various aspects of economic 
life in African countries. If development practitioners and IT professionals are serious about 
the data revolution really benefiting the poor, they need to stop seeing the poor as mere 
beneficiaries of aid and start seeing them as economic and political agents in their own right. 
Awareness about data needs to happen at the so-called ‘bottom of the pyramid’, not just in 
tech hubs and non-government organizations. As developers often depend on producer 
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associations and non-profit networks to scale up, such organizations might have some 
leverage. I thus want to end this article by emphasizing not just the structural factors shaping 
data governance from above, but also the opportunities for agency to sculpt structure from 
below. Big data is likely to reshape powerful economic and political hierarchies across Africa 
and the rest of the developing world, and researchers, policy makers, software developers, 
civil society groups and other interested parties all need to be more critical of these 
developments and speak up. 
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